Mark Halladay and Merle Halladay v. Madge Cluff, Perry K. Bigelow and Norma G. Bigelow : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Mark Halladay and Merle Halladay v. Madge Cluff,
Perry K. Bigelow and Norma G. Bigelow : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs and Jeffs;attorneys for respondent. S. Rex Lewis; Howard, Lewis and Petersen;
Attorneys for Defendants.
Brent D. Young; Ivie and Young; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Response to Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Certiorari, Halladay v. Cluff, No. 870280.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1692
gnu 
v,mrm 
o;»Oi<ci >» 
$70 280 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE HALLADAY. ) 
MADGE 
NORMA 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. ) 
vs. ) 
CLUFF. PERRY K. BIGELOW. and ) 
G. BIGELOW. ) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
Case No. 8 7 0 2 8 0 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorneys for Respondent Cluff 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
Ivie and Young 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Appellants 
S. REX LEWIS 
Howard. Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow 
(Not Participating) 
• I m %*m$ PTS^ 
SEP 2 81987 
Clerk, 3uprame Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF. PERRY K. BIGELOW. and 
NORMA G. BIGELOW. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 870280 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
Ivie and Young 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Appellants 
S. REX LEWIS 
Howard. Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo. Utah 84603 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo. UT 84603 
Attorneys for Respondent Cluff 
Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow 
(Not Participating) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT CLUFF OPPPOSING 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are those contained in 
the caption of the case. However. Perry K. Bigelow and Norma 
G. Bigelow are not party to this petition. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 2 
JURISDICTION 2 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I 
PETITIONER DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A JUSTIFIABLE 
BASIS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI 9 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CLUFF DID NOT ABANDON HER CLAIM AS TO 
PARCEL W-X-Y-Z. THE HOLDING OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD 11 
CONCLUSION 14 
APPENDIX "A" APPENDIX "B" 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Fuoco v. Williams. 15 Utah 2d 156. 389 P.2d 3. 13 
998 (1964) 
Hales v. Frakes. Utah. 600 P.2d 156. 389 P.2d 3. 13 
143 (1979) 
Halladay v. Cluff. et al.. 685 P.Rptr.2d 500 3 
(1984) 
Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 4, 8 
Rule 42. Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 2 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 9 
78-2-2(3)(a) Utah Code Annotated. 1953 2 
as amended 
IN rHE SUPREME rnwr -j; THE 
MACK HALLADAv uiu nrfRLE HALLADAY. 
P1aintiffs/Appellants. 
MADGE l.Uil . PERRY 
NORMA G. B1GELOW. 
De£ e ndant s / Re s p o nd e a > » . 
Case No. 870280 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUEST IONS PRESENTED FOE REVIEW" 
1. W Ii € • 11: i € • i: t: l:i ii 5 c c • 1 11: t 1 > I: 1« :> 11 1 ] I E x e 1: c ii s < = • ii t s ci ii s c • 1: 
i n g r a n t i n g t h e P e t i t i o n f o r W r :i t o f C e r 11 o r a 1:1. 
'i " 1 1 Iiether 11: 1 e Court of Appeals erred in Halladay v . 
Cluf f . 8 6 0 0 7 9 CI i 6 1 I I J 1 R i ll ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
Halladay v. Cluff. No. 860079-CA filed July 10. 1987. reported 
as Halladay v. Cluff. 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1987). A 
copy of the opinion is included as Appendix "B". 
JURISDICTION 
The date of the entry of the decision sought by Peti-
tioner to be reviewed is July 10, 1987. 
Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred upon the 
court by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (a) and by Rule 42. 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS 
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions, 
statutes, ordinances, or regulations applicable to this Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Halladays to quiet 
title to a parcel of property within the legal description of 
Halladays' title which had been occupied by the defendants 
Cluff and Bigelow, for in excess of 30 years. Mrs. Cluff 
counterclaimed, claiming ownership on the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence to a portion of the property to which the 
Halladays were seeking to quiet title. Mrs. Cluff pleaded in 
her counterclaim alternatively that if boundary by acqui-
escence did not apply, Mrs. Cluff should be entitled to 
property lying to the west of her fence line and within her 
title line, but to which the Halladays had possession for a 
number of years. (Appendix "A") 
The trial court ruled that boundary by acquiescence 
had been established and quieted title to property shown on 
Appendix "A" crosshatched in orange and noted by the designa-
tions "MNOP" to Cluff and Bigelow and awarded the green shaded 
strip of property designated as "WXYZ" to Halladay. Both 
rulings were consistent with the holdings in Fuoco v. 
Williams^ 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 998 (1964) and Hales v. 
Frakes. Utah, 600 P.2d 156, 389 P.2d 1*3 (1979). 
Halladays appealed and the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court, in Halladay y, Cluff, et al^ 685 
P.Rptt.2d 500 (1984). The case was "remanded to the district 
court for the entry of a new decree in conformity with" the 
opinion rendered in the matter. 
In reversing, this Court held that a fifth element 
for boundary by acquiescence was not present to sustain the 
lower court's decision, that being the element of a dispute or 
uncertainty over the questioned area. 
Upon remand, counsel for defendant Cluff requested a 
hearing before the trial court, and presented Mrs. Cluffs 
contention that the same rule of law should apply to the green 
shaded area on Appendix "A" marked with point designations 
"WXYZ" as applied to the orange crosshatched area marked with 
the point designations "MNOP". The trial court declined 
granting Mrs. Cluff*s request to quiet title to the area with-
in her title line. i.e.. the green shaded area on Appendix 
"A", marked "WXYZ". lying beyond the fence line. 
From the trial court's ruling upon said remand 
hearing. Mrs. Cluff filed an appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 
10. 1987. 
Because there have been two appeals of this matter, 
the transcript of the trial contains three numbering series at 
the bottom right-hand corner of the transcript. The typed 
number beginning with page 1 was the assigned number the court 
reporter gave to the transcript at the time that the tran-
script was typed. The stamped number on the same page in the 
file transcript commencing with the number 102 was the number 
given in the record filed with the Supreme Court on the first 
appeal of this matter. The stamped number on the same page in 
the file transcript commencing with the number 40 is the 
number system applied by the county clerk on the second 
appeal. The most recently stamped numbers will be those 
referred to in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the commencement of this case, the 
defendant, Cluff, had occupied property within an old 
established fence line for over 30 years. (R. 153:18-26; 
155:12-21). The testimony of the plaintiffs1 witness, Elmo 
Halladay, testified that the fence line had been placed prior 
to 1930 and that the fence line was a continuous unbroken 
fence line in U shape, going from the front of 100 South 
Street in Provo, Utah, north some 231 feet, then across the 
back the width of the Cluff and Bigelow properties, then 
returning south to the street. (R. 99:3-24). The plaintiffs 
had occupied the portion of the property lying within the 
defendant Cluff's title line, but lying west of the old fence, 
a strip approximately ten feet wide by the length of her 
property (shaded green on Appendix "A"). (R. 100:28-30; 
101:1-9). Mrs. Cluff had occupied the area crosshatched in 
orange in Appendix "A" attached hereto for the same period of 
time (Elmo Halladay, R. 106:6-13; 118:11-17). 
At the time of the commencement of the suit, the 
defendant Cluff filed a counterclaim alleging that the 
property crosshatched in orange had become her property and 
that of Bigelow by boundary by acquiescence and acknowledging 
the same facts as to the property shown in green occupied by 
the plaintiffs (R. 12-15). The defendant Cluff. however, 
pleaded in the alternative that if the trial court determined 
that there was not a boundary by acquiescence and that the 
title lines were to govern, then the trial court should award 
to Cluff the property west of her fence but within her title 
line, shown in green on Appendix "A", and that the property 
shown crosshatched in orange should be awarded to Halladay 
based upon title lines (R 12-15). 
One distinguishing factual circumstance was that 
Halladays' title line did not connect to Cluff1s title line. 
There was a no man's land between the title line of Halladays 
and the title line of Cluff. as demonstrated by plaintiffs1 
witness. the engineer Clyde Naylor (R. 75;27-30; 76:1). 
Thus, Halladays could not meet the requirement of being 
adjoining property necessary to have boundary by acquiescence 
on the green shaded property. 
In the opening statements to the court in the trial 
of this matter, which was tried without a jury. Cluff1s 
counsel emphasized that pursuant to the counterclaim, if the 
court should conclude that the area shown crosshatched in 
orange were to be awarded to Cluff by applying the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, then the area shown shaded in green 
should go to the Halladays on the same doctrine. But if the 
court should rule that title lines governed, then the green 
area should go to Cluff and the orange area should go to 
Halladays (R. 52:21-30; 53:1-14; 56:1-20). 
At the time the Halladays moved into the area in 
approximately 1930. the fence line shown on Appendix "A" and 
marked by points Y to X to M, running north and south, thence 
easterly to point N, thence south to point O and back to 100 
South Street, was in place. The title line of the Cluff 
property as testified to by Clyde Naylor, Halladays1 engineer 
witness, encompassed the green shaded area, points "WXYZ". 
There was a gap which is shown on Appendix "A" as shaded blue, 
lying just to the west of the Cluff title line (R. 75:27-30; 
76:1). The testimony of Elmo Halladay, Mack Halladay, and 
Madge Cluff all indicate that the area to the west of the old 
fence and lying within the Cluff title line had been occupied 
by the Halladays for many years. Likewise, the area encom-
passed in orange crosshatching. that point of "MNOP" lying to 
the north of the Cluff property, had been occupied by the 
Cluffs for the same period of years (R. 106:6-13; 118:11-17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari presents to the 
Supreme Court the same considerations which were before the 
Supreme Court at the time that it elected to exercise its 
discretion under Rule 4A(a) by transferring the case to the 
Court of Appeals. By transferring the case for decision from 
that court, the decision might have been in favor of the 
appellant or of the respondent. The granting of certiorari is 
premature and would tend to frustrate the purposes for 
establishing a court of appeals. 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari raises the same 
points raised by the brief on appeal presented to the Court of 
Appeals. The granting of the Petition for the Writ of 
Certiorari would be inferential finding that the panel of the 
Court of Appeals which decided this case did not consider the 
Petitioner's brief. 
The issues raised by the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and the brief supporting the Petition are the 
identical issues and arguments presented to the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals specifically found that there 
was no abandonment of Cluff's claim to the green shaded area, 
but only an alternative theory applicable to both the parcel 
lying within Halldays1 title line and the parcel lying with 
Cluff's title line. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A JUSTIFIABLE BASIS 
FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI. 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari cites Rule 43 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court as being satisfied in this 
Petition for Certiorari. However, Petitioner does not address 
that in his Brief in Support of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
It is probable that every case assigned by the 
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals could be the subject 
matter of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari under one of the 
considerations set forth in Rule 43. Each litigant who loses 
in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals could peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari with the hope that the Supreme 
Court would reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Each decision could be claimed to be contrary to the decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court, or an interpretation of the deci-
sions of the Utah Supreme Court, as Petitioner claims in this 
case, that the Court of Appeals did not follow the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court in the first appeal. 
It is this writer's understanding that the prime 
thrust for and the legislative and constitutional changes 
effectuated to create the Court of Appeals was to reduce the 
caseload in the Supreme Court and to afford more expeditious 
rulings on the tremendous volume of cases being appealed from 
the lower courts and administrative agencies. If the Court of 
Appeals becomes an additional step in the pipeline of ultimate 
justice with each litigant attempting to appeal up from the 
decision of that court, the purposes for which that court was 
established would be frustrated. 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is premature, 
since the ruling of the Court of Appeals remanded the case 
back to the trial court for further hearings to determine if 
the same factual circumstances apply to the green shaded area 
as to the orange crosshatched area, and instructed the trial 
court to enter an appropriate decree in conformity with this 
Court's earlier decision. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals on the applicability of the earlier decision of this 
Court to the green shaded area and conceivably whatever the 
trial court does may yet be the subject matter of a further 
appeal. As such, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is pre-
mature. It is in conformity with the proper procedure for 
filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but it should be 
declined by this Court. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CLUFF DID NOT ABANDON HER CLAIM AS TO 
PARCEL W-X-Y-Z. THE HOLDING OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD. 
The thrust of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
a claim that the defendant Cluff abandoned any claim to the 
property shown shaded green in Appendix "A". 
Pleading in the alternative in her counterclaim. 
Madge Cluff alleged that the property shaded green and marked 
by points "WXYZ" on Appendix "A" was within the description of 
her legal title but outside the old fence line. Madge Cluff 
alleged that if the court ruled that boundary by acquiescence 
was not applicable to Madge Cluff1s acquisition of the area 
shown crosshatched in orange, the area shown as shaded in 
green and marked by points "WXYZ" was beyond the old fence 
line, but within Madge1 Cluff1s title line and asserted that 
the same doctrine should be applied to parcel "MNOP" as is 
applied to "WXYZ". 
In counsel's opening statement to the court (R. 52), 
Madge Cluff1s counsel stated to the court: 
We think that the rule of law and the factual 
circumstances are identical on the green slashed 
area as on the orange slashed area except to the 
party who is in possession. (R. 52:21-24). 
In the evidence presented to the court, it was shown 
that Halladays had been in possession of the green shaded area 
for a number of years and Mrs. Cluff had been in possession of 
that portion of the orange crosshatched area contiguous to her 
title line for the same period of time. This writer went on 
to inform the court of that possession (R. 56). wherein he 
What I am saying, when I said that the same 
principle lies, if the court is going to follow 
title lines rather than boundary by acqui-
escence, then we would be entitled to the green 
slashed area and we believe that if Mr. Halladay 
is entitled to the orange slashed area to his 
title line, that we are entitled to move over to 
the title line. There should be a consistency. 
(R. 56:1-7) 
THE COURT: . . . [B]ut as far as the fence line 
is concerned here, you don't claim to the west 
of it, right Mr. Jeffs? 
That's true, we think it became theirs by boun-
dary by acquiescence, the same as we claim the 
other piece. But, if the court were to adopt 
the rule that there was no boundary by 
acquiescence, and you are going to examine the 
title, then I think we will be entitled to that 
title. (R. 56:8-20). 
The Court of Appeals, in substantial detail, reviewed 
the very issue raised by Petitioner in the Brief in Support of 
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and said, at page 42: 
We have reviewed the record, with consid-
erable care, with an eye toward determining 
whether the claim was unqualifiedly waived. 
Cluff's counterclaim was crystal clear that she 
should be declared the owner of the orange par-
cel on the basis of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, but that if she was unsuccessful, 
she should be declared the owner of the green 
parcel because of the "identical circumstances" 
concerning each parcel. At trial. Cluff 
explained her position, through counsel, in 
response to the court's initial perception that 
she was conceding her rights to the green 
parcel: 
[quoting the above-quoted statement of this 
writer]. 
The Court of Appeals went on to point out that after 
the case was over, the trial court rendered its decision, by 
saying: 
It recited no waiver or concession by Cluff as to 
the green parcel, but rather reached the merits 
and found that Halladays had established 
entitlement to it on the basis of boundary by 
acquiescence under the cases of Fuoco v. 
Williams. 15 Utah 2d 156. 389 P.2d 143 (1964). 
and Hales v. Frakes. 600 P.2d 556 (1979). 
The Court of Appeals further concluded: "We see in 
none of this any concession or waiver by Cluff.11 
The Court of Appeals made very clear that its deci-
sion was on the very issue now urged by Petitioners after a 
careful consideration by the Court of Appeals, when that court 
went on to say: 
While we would in any event be unwilling to 
construe that brief exchange between the court 
and Halladays* counsel as a concession by 
Cluff. we are especially not inclined to do so 
since the court in its decision made no mention 
of any concession or waiver by Cluff. but 
rather spoke in terms of a decision on the 
merits. At the hearing before the trial court 
following remand by the Supreme Court. Halla-
days1 counsel acknowledged that the green 
parcel had been tried and not resolved by stip-
ulation. Moreover, the court's remarks at that 
hearing, and in its subsequent written ruling, 
make clear the exclusive basis for its decision 
not to reconsider its disposition of the green 
parcel was its conclusion that the failure of 
Cluff to cross-appeal precluded it from doing 
so. No mention was made by the court of any 
prejudgment concession or waiver by Cluff. 
The issue now raised was fully considered and well 
decided by the Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has demonstrated none of the impelling 
considerations necessary for this court to exercise its 
discretion and grant a Writ of Certiorari. The attempt to 
have the matter reviewed by this court is an attempt to 
provide another step in the pipeline, and would render the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals meaningless. The matter has 
been remanded to the trial court for further evaluation and 
entry of a decree in conformity with the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, and that procedure should be allowed to go forward. 
This court should deny the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of September, 
1987. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Halladays commenced this action to quiet 
title to a parcel of property sometimes referred 
to as the orange parcel. They relied on their 
holding actual legal title. Cluff counterclaimed 
seeking to quiet title to the orange parcel on 
the basis of boundary by acquiescence and, 
alternatively, seeking to quiet title to another 
parcel of property, sometimes referred to as 
the green parcel, if the court determined to 
adjudicate the rights of the parties with refe-
rence to legal titles rather than on the basis of 
boundary by acquiescence. The unusual situ-
ation came about because Halladays held legal 
title to the orange parcel, which Cluff1 occu-
pied, while Cluff held legal title to the green 
parcel, which Halladays occupied. If occup-
ancy controlled, Cluff would own the orange 
tcntly applied theory would cither party De 
entitled to both parcels. 
Cluff was successful at trial, persuading the 
court to adjust the parties' competing rights 
on the basis of the boundary by acquiescence 
doctrine. Thus, she was held to have title to 
the larger orange parcel primarily in dispute, 
but Halladays got the smaller green parcel on 
the same basis. 
Halladays appealed to the Supreme Court 
and were successful there. Halladay v. Cluff, 
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court 
held that boundary by acquiescence did not 
apply, given the facts developed at trial, and 
that legal title should control. See id. at 507. 
Of course, since the judgment had been 
adverse to Halladays only as concerned the 
orange parcel, the orange parcel was the focus 
of the appeal.2 The case was remanded for 
entry of "a new decree in conformity" with the 
Supreme Court's opinion. 
On remand, Cluff argued that consistency 
with the Supreme Court's analysis required 
that her alternative claim be granted. Cluff 
argued that if legal title was to control, it 
should control the whole dispute, and she 
should be awarded the green parcel, to which 
she held title. 
The trial court, however, concluded that 
d u f f s failure to take a cross-appeal from 
the determination concerning the green parcel 
foreclosed any re-examination of that issue. 
We cannot agree. Cross-appeals are properly 
limited to grievances a party has with the 
judgment as it was entered-not grievances 
it might acquire depending on the outcome of 
the appeal. See Cunningham v. Lynch-
Davidson Motors, Inc., 425 So.2d 131, 133 
(Fla. App. 1982)(cross-appeal only required 
when respondent seeks to vary or modify 
judgment below); Terry v. Zions Co-Op. 
Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 
1980)("[I]f a respondent desires to attack the 
judgment and change it in his favor, he must 
timely file a cross-appeal ..."). See also 15 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Pra-
ctice and Procedure §3904 (1976). 
Cluff knew all along she could not have it 
both ways. Either boundary by acquiescence 
would apply, in which case she would win the 
larger parcel but lose the smaller, or legal titles 
would control, in which event she would lose 
the larger parcel but at least get the smaller 
one.3 She could not plausibly argue one theory 
as to one parcel and another as to the other 
and walk away with both contested parcels. 
On balance, Cluff would come out much 
better if the boundary by acquiescence argu-
ment carried the day. She accordingly argued 
for application of that theory. She prevailed at 
the trial level to the fullest extent possible 
consistent with a disciplined decision, even 
thoueh she "lost" as to the green parcel. 
proper response IO that appeal uas io ICMS. 
the Halladays1 arguments and seek to have the 
trial court affirmed. A cross-appeal would 
not have been appropriate. Cluff had no dis-
satisfaction with the trial court's judgment, 
which she simply wanted to have affirmed. 
Moreover, a cross-appeal would have left 
Cluff and Halladays making inconsistent and 
contrary arguments depending on which parcel 
was being focused on.4 
Thus, the absence of a cross-appeal did 
not, of itself, foreclose the trial court from 
reassessing the status of the green parcel in 
view of the Supreme Court's decision and 
changing its decree as to that parcel as well, so 
the "new decree" would be fully "in confor-
mity" with the doctrine expressed in the 
Court's opinion.5 
However, for the trial court to be able to 
address the green parcel on remand, i.e., to 
reconsider the claim in the alternative that if 
Cluff did not own the orange parcel she 
owned the green one, it would be necessary 
that that claim had not been compromised, 
dismissed, or otherwise unconditionally disp-
osed of. If, as Halladays suggest on this 
appeal, Cluff unqualifiedly waived her claim 
to the smaller parcel, without regard to the 
disposition made as to the larger one or the 
legal doctrine underlying that disposition, 
Cluff would not be entitled to any relief. If, 
on the other hand, the claim to the green 
parcel was expressly preserved or had been 
resolved only as a necessary part of the basic 
determination concerning boundary by acqu-
iescence, Cluff would clearly be entitled to an 
opportunity to show the trial court that the 
Supreme Court's reversal as to the larger 
parcel necessitates a "reversal" as to the other.6 
We have reviewed the record, with consid-
erable care, with an eye toward determining 
whether the claim was unqualifiedly waived, 
d u f f s counterclaim was crystal clear that she 
should be declared the owner of the orange 
parcel on the basis of the doctrine of boun-
dary by acquiescence, but that if she was 
unsuccessful, she should be declared the owner 
of the green parcel because of the "identical 
circumstances" concerning each parcel. At 
trial, Cluff explained her position, through 
counsel, in response to the court's initial 
perception that she was conceding her rights to 
the green parcel: 
What I'm saying, when I said the 
same principle lies, if the Court is 
going to follow title lines, rather 
than boundary by acquiescence, 
then we would be entitled- to the 
green slashed area. And we believe 
that if Mr. Halladay is entitled to 
the orange slashed area to this title 
line, that we are entitled to move 
nvw tn the title line That there 
snouia oe a consisiency. 
Counsel for Halladays then sought to chara-
cterize Guffs position as conceding the green 
parcel. The court explained that Cluff simply 
wanted a consistent legal approach and conc-
luded by observing: "So there will be no stip-
ulations on that." The parties then presented 
their evidence. After argument, the court 
issued a written decision. It recited no waiver 
or concession by Cluff as to the green parcel, 
but rather reached the merits and found that 
Halladays had established entitlement to it on 
the basis of boundary by acquiescence under 
the cases of Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 
156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964), and Hales v. Frakcs, 
600 P.2d 556 (1979). Conversely, the trial 
court found, relying principally on the same 
cases, that Cluff had established entitlement to 
the orange parcel on the basis of boundary by 
acquiescence. Subsequently, the court entered 
Findings and Conclusions which reflect that 
the court reached the merits on both the green 
and the orange parcels and decided both sit-
uations on the basis of a consistent application 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
A single, short decree recited the result of the 
court's decision and quieted title to the green 
parcel in Halladays and the orange parcel in 
Cluff. 
We see in none of this any concession or 
waiver by Cluff. The only place to which 
Halladays specifically point us in support of 
their contention that there was such a waiver, 
is at best ambiguous. The exchange followed 
an unreported bench conference and is, in its 
entirety, as follows: 
The Court: As a result of a Bench 
Conference, I think there is no issue 
on that particular area, Mr. Young. 
Mr. Young: The area of "W\ "X" 
"Y" and "Z" on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
8? 
The Court: Yes. 
While we would in any event be unwilling to 
construe that brief exchange between the court 
and Halladays9 counsel as a concession by 
Cluff, we are especially not inclined to do so 
since the court in its decision made no 
mention of any concession or waiver by Cluff, 
but rather spoke in terms of a decision on the 
merits. At the hearing before the trial court 
following remand by the Supreme Court, 
Halladays' counsel acknowledged that the 
green parcel had been tried and not resolved 
by stipulation. Moreover, the court's remarks 
at that hearing, and in its subsequent written 
ruling, make clear the exclusive basis for its 
decision not to reconsider its disposition of the 
green parcel was its conclusion that the failure 
of Cluff to cross-appeal precluded it from 
doing so. No mention was made by the court 
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October 18, 1984 is vacated and the case is 
again remanded to the trial court "for the 
entry of a new decree in conformity with" the 
Supreme Court's prior decision. In that 
regard, Cluff is entitled to an opportunity to 
show the trial court that the evidence adduced 
at trial as to the green parcel, when squared 
with the Supreme Court's decision, entitles 
Cluff to the green parcel. If it does, the "new 
decree" contemplated by the Supreme Court 
should so provide. Costs of this appeal to 
Cluff. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. The orange parcel was actually occupied and 
claimed by the Bigelows and Cluff, adjacent land-
owners, apparently as though the undisputed bou-
ndary between them continued on through the 
orange parcel. Bigelows are not parties to the instant 
appeal and in the interest of simplicity we refer only 
to Cluff even in situations where technically the 
reference should be to "Cluff and Bigelows." 
2. The orange parcel, labeled MNOP on Cluffs 
exhibits, was referred to in Halladay v. Cluff, 685 
P.2d 500 (Utah 1981), as the ABCD parcel. Id, at 
502. The green parcel, labeled WXYZ on the exhi-
bits, was not delineated on the Supreme Court's 
map, but lies to the west of the ADE line on their 
map. Sec id. 
3. The trial court appreciated the need for a consi-
stent approach to the entire dispute and later refe-
rred to its decree as "a fence-line decree." 
4. The facts of this case are extremely unusual and 
it might even look like a case where some kind of 
"contingent" cross-appeal should have been filed. 
That illusion disappears if one focuses not on the 
component parts of the dispute but rather on the 
dispute as a whole and the pivotal role in its resol-
ution of the selection and consistent application of 
one of two competing legal doctrines. Generally, 
however, the decision whether to cross appeal is 
simple. If a respondent wishes to modify or vary the 
trial court's judgment, he must cross appeal. See 
Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1060 
(Del. Supr. 1986X*[Albsent a cross-appeal, the 
{respondent] may not attack the judgment of the 
court below with a view to enlarging its own rights 
or lessening the rights of its adversary."); Terry v. 
Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701 
(Utah 1980). If he only wants the judgment affi-
rmed, he should not cross appeal. Nothing in this 
opinion should be taken to create allowances for 
parties who should cross appeal but do not. See, 
e.g., Bentky v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 622 (Utah 
1984); Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 
1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982); Eiiason v. Watts, 
615 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah 1980). Sec also Ryan v. 
State, 150 Ariz. 549, 724 P.2d 1218, 223 (Ariz.App. 
1986Krespondent can't raise assignment of error 
because issue not made subject 'of cross-appeal); 
Broadhead v. McEntirc, 19 Ark.App. 259, 720 
S.W.2d 313, 318 (l986Krespondent can't argue for 
' *•' *• v - r : i j 
precluded raising attorney's fee issue). 
5. Trial courts are in a much better position to 
evaluate an entire case, including its nuances and 
undisclosed pitfalls, than an appellate court. It is for 
this reason that where, as in this case, all possible 
ramifications of a decision on appeal may not be 
readily apparent, a case will be remanded for such 
proceedings as arc appropriate in view of the guid-
ance offered in the opinion. It is no doubt for this 
reason the Supreme Court, in addition to specific-
ally directing the trial court to quiet title to the 
orange parcel in the Halladays, remanded in general 
terms for "the entry of a new decree in conformity 
with" its opinion. 
6. Loosely following the trial court's characteriza-
tion quoted in Note 2, supra, Cluff wants nothing 
more than an opportunity to persuade the trial court 
that the Supreme Court's decision simply means the 
court's decree should have been a "title-lines 
decree" rather than a "fence-line decree." 
